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Since the terrorist attacks and anthrax release in 2001, almost $32 billion has been allocated to biodefense and biosurveillance in
the USA alone. Surveillance in health care refers to the continual systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination
ofdata.Whenattemptingtodetectagentsofbioterrorism,surveillancecanoccurinseveralways.Syndromicsurveillanceoccursby
monitoring clinical manifestations of certain illnesses. Laboratory surveillance occurs by looking for certain markers or laboratory
data, and environmental surveillance is the process by which the ambient air or environment is continually sampled for the
presence of biological agents. This paper focuses on the ways by which we detect bioterrorism agents and the eﬀectiveness of
these systems.
1.Introduction
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the
anthrax release in the following month, there has been a
heightened interest in bioterrorism surveillance. The years
immediately following these attacks were met with increased
awareness and funding from the federal government. This
paper will focus on the methods that we can use to prepare
ourselves and detect these bioagent attacks.
The anthrax attacks of 2001, the SARS outbreak in 2004,
and the recent H1N1 Inﬂuenza outbreak remind us that
an essential component of preparedness for bioterrorism
includes surveillance methods that can detect and monitor
the course of an outbreak and thus minimize associated
morbidity and mortality [1]. Surveillance of a population
can be achieved in several ways. Syndromic surveillance
occurs by monitoring clinical manifestations of certain
illnesses. This type of surveillance occurs when health-
related data, like International Classiﬁcation of Diseases Ninth
Revision (ICD-9) codes, are analyzed to signal possibility
of an outbreak. Laboratory surveillance occurs by looking
for certain markers or laboratory data. The Laboratory
Response Network (LRN) is the United States’ laboratory
system for detecting, conﬁrming, and reporting bioterrorism
agents. Within the LRN, sentinel laboratories are tasked
with singling out suspicious specimens for further testing
in higher-tier labs. Environmental surveillance is the process
by which the ambient air or the environment is continually
sampled for the presence of biological agents [2].
Unfortunately, the practice of bioterrorism surveillance
remains poorly studied. A recent systematic review of 29
biosurveillance systems concluded that there is insuﬃcient
evidence to determine which of these systems is best [1].
One thing is known. Whether it is an astute clinician like
the one who made the ﬁrst diagnosis of anthrax in 2001 or
the complex chemical lab techniques that are used to detect
plague, we must maintain our ability to identify and respond
to a biologic terrorist attack.
2.Background
Surveillance is recognized as the single most important pub-
lic health instrument for identifying public health events
of global concern, particularly infectious diseases that are
emerging [3]. Not only is the use of surveillance helpful2 Advances in Preventive Medicine
for bioterror attacks, but also the information generated by
surveillance systems is also useful in the recognition and
response to emerging infectious diseases. These epidemics
are not related to traditional bioterror agents but their public
healthsigniﬁcancecanbeequallyalarming.TherecentH1N1
Inﬂuenza outbreak is a prime example of this.
The four functions of basic surveillance include (1)
detecting cases of disease in speciﬁc populations and report-
ing the information, (2) analyzing and conﬁrming reported
case information to detect outbreaks, (3) providing timely
and appropriate responses at the local/regional level to allow
appropriate national level prevention and control of disease
outbreaks, and (4) providing epidemiologic intelligence
information to assist in long-term management of public
health and health-care policies and programs [3].
Surveillance in health care refers to the continual system-
atic collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination
of data [4]. Early methods of public health surveillance
have been passive and voluntary. This process occurred
when patients were diagnosed with a reportable commu-
nicable disease and local health departments were notiﬁed
by clinicians, hospitals, or laboratories. Time would pass
as information meandered through local and state health
departments. Although many of the key components of
surveillance occur at the local level, it takes many working
parts for this to occur in a timely fashion.
Passive surveillance is an important component to global
biosurveillance. It has the advantages of being inexpensive,
easytoimplement,andfreeoftechnologicbarriers.However,
it likely is not rapid and accurate enough to be used alone
to respond to a bioterrorist attack. Passive surveillance is
used best with other methods to quickly identify the treat
and institute public health protection measures such as
immunization, prophylaxis, and quarantine.
Active surveillance is the method of tracking emerg-
ing infectious disease threats. Active surveillance involves
outreach to actively collect disease information from spe-
ciﬁc groups, such as sentinel medical providers or hospitals.
Typically, active surveillance is undertaken to look for
a speciﬁc disease. Active surveillance is more labor intensive
and requires more public health resources than passive
surveillance [5].
Systems for bioterrorism surveillance for public health
require 3 key features: timeliness, high sensitivity and spec-
iﬁcity, and routine analysis of data [1]. Timeliness of di-
agnosis is vital as the eﬀectiveness of most treatments hinges
on early detection. To this end, the electronic collection
and reporting of surveillance data has improved detection
as compared with manual methods [1]. High sensitivity is
necessary as, without this, systems may fail to detect cases
of bioterrorism-related illness which could result in delays
in detection. On the opposite end, systems with inadequate
speciﬁcity may have frequent false alarms, which will result
in costly public health responses. Using the example of a
food-borne illness outbreak, a system with low sensitivity
may miss the sentinel cases and not identify the trend until
the outbreak is already widespread. This compromises the
ability of the surveillance system to adequately mount an
eﬀective public health response to the outbreak. Using the
same example, a system with low speciﬁcity may identify
cases which are not truly related to an outbreak resulting
in an unnecessary public health response with diversion of
resources from other true outbreaks. Sensitivity and speci-
ﬁcity are typically inversely related such that optimization of
one characteristic is at some expense to the other. Striking
the optimal balance between these two characteristics for any
given surveillance system is diﬃcult [1].
3.SyndromicSurveillance
The ﬁrst key to identifying a potential bioterrorism event
is to maintain a strong index of suspicion. The initial cases
of West Nile Fever Virus in 1999 and the deliberate release
of anthrax in 2001 were ultimately diagnosed by astute
clinicians working hand-in-hand with lab technicians, not
by public health surveillance systems. Syndromic data are
gathered before laboratory results are reported; therefore,
health departments may be able to recognize increases in
disease incidence before formal diagnoses are made and to
respond to outbreaks early in their course. For this reason,
the CDC, state and local public health agencies, and the US
Governmentandmilitaryhaveinvestedheavilyinsyndromic
surveillance.
Methods of syndromic surveillance include many clues
and data points which public health personnel can use
to identify patterns. Data sources such as nurse hotline
calls, over-the-counter medication purchases, and chief
complaints from emergency-department visits can monitor
illness clusters [6]. Some other clues to suspicious events
include sharp rises in the frequency or severity of com-
municable diseases, including those in animals. Additional
red ﬂags include an unusual cluster or age distribution,
occurrence of rare diseases, presence or lack of exposure
history, travel to an endemic location, unexplained deaths,
or pathogens with unusual antimicrobial resistance [7].
In response to the events of 2001, new types of surveil-
lance systems were developed to detect epidemics through
population-based reporting of symptoms tracked by time
and region [8]. Many cities and states in the United States
use syndromic surveillance, which monitors nonspeciﬁc,
prediagnostic indicators for disease outbreaks in near real-
time to provide an early warning of infectious disease
outbreaks in their communities. Syndromic surveillance
systems (SSS) monitor descriptive data from clinical diag-
noses, chief complaints, and behaviors (e.g., school and
work absenteeism, illness-related 911 calls, emergency room
admissions for symptoms indicative of infectious disease) to
infer patterns suggestive of an outbreak [9]. A comparison of
syndromic surveillance with traditional clinical recognition
is presented in Table 1 [10].
The most important determinants of detection for any
given SSS were analyzed in a methodological review of 35
evaluations of outbreak detection in automated SSSs [11].
These determinants are key to taking one or more high-
volume data feeds and diﬀerentiating the outbreak cases or
“signal” from the baseline cases or “noise.” The determinants
were subdivided into characteristics of the system andAdvances in Preventive Medicine 3
Table 1: Characteristics of bioterrorism-related epidemics that aﬀect detection through clinical recognition versus syndromic surveillance.
Characteristicsa Clinical recognitionb Syndromic surveillancec
Duration and variability of
incubation period
Broader distribution of incubation
period increases likelihood that
patients with short incubation-period
disease would be diagnosed before a
statistical threshold of syndromic cases
is exceeded.
More narrow distribution of incubation
period which leads to a steeper epidemic
curve in the initial phases increase




Shorter prodrome increases likelihood
of recognition or diagnosis at more
severe or fulminant stage.
Longer prodrome increases likelihood
that increase in syndromic manifestations
would be detectable and that recognition
of more severe stage (at which a diagnosis
is more apt to be made) would be
delayed.
Presence or absence of
clinical sign that would
heighten suspicion of
diagnosis
Presence increases likelihood of earlier
clinical recognition and diagnosis
(e.g., mediastinal widening on chest
X-ray in inhalational anthrax or
multiple cases of rare disease
presenting at similar time).
Absence decreases likelihood that
diagnosis would be considered clinically,
increasing opportunity for earlier
detection by means of syndromic
surveillance.
Likelihood of making
diagnosis in the course of
routine clinical evaluation
If diagnosis is apt to be made in the
course of a routine diagnostic
evaluation (not dependent on clinical
suspicion of speciﬁc bioterrorism
infection), early diagnosis through
clinical care is likely.
If diagnosis is dependent on the use of a
special test that is unlikely to be ordered
in the absence of clinical suspicion of
diagnosis, then diagnosis in clinical care
may be delayed, increasing the
opportunity for early detection through
syndromic surveillance.
aInfection or disease attributes that may aﬀect detection of an epidemic.
bIncreases likelihood of initial detection through routine clinical care and reporting.
cIncreases likelihood of initial detection through syndromic surveillance.
characteristics of the outbreak being monitored. While
evaluations using natural outbreaks were best suited to
answer qualitative questions, simulated outbreaks were also
useful to allow greater ﬂexibility and increased quantitative
results [11].
The inﬂuential system characteristics identiﬁed included
representativeness or sampling approach of the system,
the outbreak detection algorithm, and the speciﬁcity of
the algorithm. For example, systems that monitor a larger
proportion of the population have a higher sensitivity for
detecting an outbreak. Similarly, systems that only monitor
onetypeofclinicalsetting—suchasEDvisitsonly—wereless
sensitive. Furthermore, the studies that relied on simulated
outbreaks suggested that temporal surveillance was more
sensitive when the algorithm considered multiple days of
data at each decision point versus data from each day
individually. Important determinants related to the outbreak
includedmagnitudeandshapeofthesignalandtimingofthe
outbreak. Intuitively, signals with a rapid rise over a short
period of time improved outbreak detection as compared
with those that rose more slowly over time. The ideal
magnitude of the signal for consistent detection is not clear.
The studies indicated magnitudes ranging from 10% up to
as much as 60%. Similarly, the inﬂuence of the timing of the
signalwasnotconsistent,thoughtherewasabetterdetection
when the outbreak occurred in context of a lower baseline
of activity [11]. Based on these characteristics, one could
envision an ideal SSS that monitored a large population at
multiple clinical venues over multiple days at a time and
ﬂagged signals with rapid rise over a low baseline to at least a
magnitude of 10%.
Almost immediately after the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, The New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene (NYCDOHMH) collaborated with the
CDC to initiate an emergency-department-based syndromic
surveillanceforagents[12].Thesystemlookedforsymptoms
that could be associated with a bioagent release such as
respiratory distress, rash, gastrointestinal symptoms, neu-
rologic impairment, and sepsis. Providers ﬁlled out forms
with patient data that were analyzed by epidemiologists. This
system was up and running in 15 New York City ED’s within
2 days of its conception.
Syndromic surveillance systems monitor health care uti-
lization patterns using data collected in real time, usually
electronically.One example of a SSS is the Electronic Surveil-
lance System for the Early Notiﬁcation of Community-
Based Epidemics (ESSENCE), which automatically down-
loads ICD-9 codes from U.S. Department of Defense health
care facilities [1]. This novel use of ICD-9 codes is one way
to group patient visits into syndromes. There are more than
10,000 ICD-9 codes available [13]. Patient visits are grouped
by ESSENCE algorithms into one of eight syndromes based
on lists of selected ICD-9 codes. If an increase in number of
visits for a syndrome is noted, the clinic can be contacted for
more information and an investigation can be launched.4 Advances in Preventive Medicine
Started in November of 2003, BioSense is a CDC
Internet-based syndromic surveillance application designed
for the early detection of intentional and natural infectious
disease outbreaks [12]. BioSense receives data electronically
from several sources. The Department of Veterans Aﬀairs
and Department of Defense provide ICD-9 codes for visits to
their facilities. Retail pharmacies provide sales information
on over-the-counter medications, and Laboratory Corpora-
tion of America provides information on laboratory tests
ordered. After examination by CDC analysts, public health
oﬃcials can access their summary reports.
Current SSSs monitor the average pattern of patients re-
porting to primary care physicians or emergency-de-
partmentsandsignalanalarmwheneverthepatternchanges.
Reporting sources include emergency-departments, inten-
sive care units, hospital admission and discharge systems,
andlaboratories [8].TheRapid SyndromeValidation Project
(RSVP) relies on physicians to enter data on patients
presenting with a syndrome of interest into a computer that
has a touch-screen interface with RSVP [14].
TheEmergencyDepartmentisthemostcommonclinical
source for surveillance data, though other sources of data
have been proven to be useful. The Real-time Outbreak
and Disease Surveillance Laboratory (RODS) Pennsylvania
is the biosurveillance system for the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.Inproductionsince1999,itmonitors3million
visits to emergency rooms from 137 emergency-departments
a year and simultaneously monitors 1262 retail stores in
Pennsylvania for disease outbreaks. By utilizing the National
Retail Data Monitor (NRDM), they have found a strong
correlation that exists between the purchase of over-the-
counter (OTC) medications and emergency room visits
for constitutional illnesses. This information is useful for
predicting coming epidemics as the tracking patterns of
inﬂuenzaandseasonalgastrointestinalillnessesoftenprecede
trends in hospital data [15]. One study demonstrated that
OTC electrolyte sales preceded hospital visits for gastroin-
testinal and respiratory illnesses by 2.4 weeks [16].
The Connecticut Department of Public Health has been
eﬀectively using an SSS based on unscheduled hospital
admissions since 2001. The Hospital Admission Syndromic
Surveillance (HASS) system monitors 32 Connecticut-based
acute-care hospitals with required reporting for eleven
syndromic categories. Daily monitoring of data with weekly
comprehensive analysis allows identiﬁcation of disease clus-
ters and routine public health followup for further action or
response [17].
Syndromic surveillance eﬀorts have been expanded to
include outpatientmonitoring also.Thistypeofsystemtakes
advantage of the experience of ambulatory care physicians,
who are also likely to be among the ﬁrst to encounter
patients during the prodrome of any potential bioterrorism-
related illness. One such system developed with a private
large ambulatory multispecialty group practice in Eastern
Massachusetts demonstrated that surveillance coverage of
5–10% of a region’s population may be adequate to detect
signiﬁcant clusters of interest. Several ideal components of
this particular system included the automated collection of
information, the use of preexisting data from a standard
healthcare database, and the minimal cost for its implemen-
tation and continuous administration [18].
Although most systems for syndromic surveillance are
continuously collecting, analyzing, and reporting data, some
systems are designed for short-term use at mass-gatherings
thought to be terrorist targets. These SSSs are referred
to as event-based or “drop-in” surveillance [1]. One such
“drop-in” surveillance system studied by the Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Program demonstrated fair-to-
good agreement of patient classiﬁcation into an appropriate
syndrome category when comparing use of Emergency
Department chief complaints to discharge diagnoses. The
ﬁndings were suggestive that use of discharge diagnoses may
increase surveillance validity for “drop-in” and even possibly
automated surveillance systems [19]. It is thought that
syndromic surveillance systems are best used synergistically
with laboratory surveillance.
4.AlternativeSurveillanceSystems
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
has pioneered surveillance systems for monitoring other
indicators of disease beside the traditional symptom- and
diagnosis-based datausedforclinical andsyndromic surveil-
lance. One such system is the Early Aberration Reporting
System (EARS). This is a free tool which has been utilized
and modiﬁed in both cities (Boston, NYC, Los Angeles) and
in state public health agencies (Georgia, Florida, Tennessee,
North Carolina, and Mississippi). It uses nontraditional
public health data sources including school absenteeism
rates,over-the-countermedicationsales,911calls,veterinary
data, and ambulance run data [20].
One novel epidemiologic surveillance approach has been
developed by Google Inc and the CDC during the inﬂuenza
seasonof 2007-08. This system monitored the health-seeking
behavior of millions of users per day in the form of queries
to online search engines. Ginsberg et al. demonstrated use
of their model to estimate inﬂuenza-like illness within 85–
96% of CDC-reported actual illness prevalence for the mid-
Atlantic region of the USA. The advantages of this internet-
based system were that illness statistics were available with a
reporting lag of only one day, compared to the 7–14 day lag
of CDC surveillance reports [21].
Though the Google surveillance system was speciﬁcally
designed to monitor for inﬂuenza-like illness, the concept is
more broadly applicable to other infectious pathogens such
as bioterror agents. In addition to earlier detection of out-
breaks, other advantages include freely available information
to both the public and the government oﬃcials, automated
processing with near real-time dissemination, and relative
inexpensiveness for operation. Unfortunately, the speciﬁcity
of internet-based surveillance remains unclear and could
create more issues related to a high false-positive rate. These
systemsalsorequirelargepopulationswithadequateinternet
access across regions and socioeconomic classes [22].
Another emerging example of a web-based surveillance
system is the HealthMap Project. This collaborative under-
taking performs extraction, categorization, ﬁltration, andAdvances in Preventive Medicine 5
integrationofaggregatedreportsfrommultistreamreal-time
internet surveillance data [23]. The round-the-clock process
involves automated data mining assisted by analyst review
and reclassiﬁcation. This system speciﬁcally focuses on iden-
tifying the “breaking news” trends to avoid overwhelming
public health oﬃc i a l sw i t hl o w - i m p a c tp r o b l e m s[ 23]. The
HealthMapsystemwasappliedtotheH1N1outbreakof2009
with impressive results. The time diﬀerence between report
of suspected cases and conﬁrmed cases of H1N1 inﬂuenza
was tracked by country with an overall median lag time of
12 days [24]. This time period can and will signiﬁcantly alter
the impact of the subsequent public health response. Further
integration of these types of innovative systems with more
traditional surveillance oﬀers the greatest promise for future
surveillance of emerging diseases [24].
The true utility of the SSSs is the dissemination and
integration of its main output: surveillance data. In 2007,
the CDC’s Oﬃce of Critical Information Integration and
Exchange created of the CDC created the BioPHusion Center
with a mission to provide a CDC-wide resource that facili-
tates the exchange, integration, and visualization of relevant
information from a variety of sources to enhance agency and
programmatic situational awareness for decision-making
and early event detection. Its goal is to share timely
and actionable information to public health programs
and leaders at the national, state, local, tribal, and global
levels. They use data from a wide variety of governmental,
private, and other sources to create an integrated daily
report of potential events available through their Public
Health Information Integration Portal [25]. Other publicly
accessed CDC resources for information exchange include
the Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X) and the Public
Health Information Network (PHIN).
5.LaboratorySurveillance
Clinical laboratories have been the cornerstone of diagnosis
in infectious diseases of public health importance. In 1999,
the CDC, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) estab-
lishedthe Laboratory ResponseNetwork (LRN)of about120
laboratories [26]. The RODS laboratory is an example of one
such system used for active surveillance as well as research
eﬀorts in the ﬁeld of biosurveillance [15]. The mission of
the LRN is to maintain an integrated network of laboratories
that are fully equipped to respond to acts of chemical or
biological terrorism, emerging infectious diseases, and other
public health emergencies [26, 27]. In addition to identifying
agents, the LRN is responsible for developing protocols
for the handling, identifying, and reporting of potential
biological agents to other national security agencies [2].
The LRN includes federal laboratories (CDC), state and
local public health labs, military labs (the United States
Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID)), food testing (FDA), environmental labora-
tories, veterinary laboratories (United States Department
of Agriculture), and international laboratories (Canada,
the United Kingdom, and Australia) [2]. The laboratories
involved in the LRN are divided into levels A through D,
based on capabilities and function. Table 2 describes the
levels of labs and their function [2, 26, 27].
As described in Table 2 above, sentinel laboratories are
the ﬁrst tier of the LRN and are responsible for sorting
through their daily routine clinical tests to ﬁnd suspicious
biothreat specimens. The response to a local outbreak is
the ﬁrst and, perhaps, most important level. Sentinel lab-
oratories must operate using Biosafety Level 2 procedures
and possess a class II certiﬁed biological safety cabinet [27].
These labs are staﬀed by workers with only basic sentinel lab
training. When a suspected biothreat agent is identiﬁed by
one of these workers, it is sent to the local and state public
health labs that comprise the second tier of the LRN. These
reference laboratories then perform rapid conﬁrmatory
testing while maintaining biosafety level (BSL-3) facilities
[7]. Once this threat is conﬁrmed, it is passed on to the
third tier in the LRN, the national laboratories. The national
laboratories are equipped with the most secure containment
labs (BSL-4) that they can use if necessitated by the agent.
Eﬀective communication between the laboratory divi-
sions is essential to preparedness. Ongoing dialogue between
clinicians, sentinel laboratories, and LRN reference laborato-
ries is essential to conﬁrm the diagnosis quickly. In the USA,
if a sentinel laboratory cannot rule out a bioterrorism agent,
t h e ni tm u s tb er e f e r r e dt oa nL R Nr e f e r e n c el a b o r a t o r y[ 7].
For cases garnering high suspicion, state public oﬃcials are
typically contacted and specimens are transported under the
jurisdiction of law enforcement.
The following principles described by Pien et al. guide
clinicians with respect to sentinel laboratory evaluation of
potential bioterrorism agents [7]. (1) The initial evaluat-
ing physician should obtain optimum specimen collection
instructions from the sentinel laboratory and alert them
to the possibility of dangerous pathogen. (2) To maximize
speed, accuracy, and safety, sentinel laboratories should
limit culture manipulation to what is required by LRN
reference labs. (3) Labs are to not inoculate highly suspected
smallpox, hemorrhagic fever viruses, alphaviruses, or any
unknown viral agents of potential bioterrorism into cell
culture. Local public health authorities or the CDC should
be contacted prior to collection. (4) Labs are directed to
not send environmental (e.g., packages, powders, letters,
soil, or water), food, animal, or plant specimens to sentinel
laboratories for analysis. Instead, these should be referred
directly to a LRN reference laboratory. (5) Finally, to reduce
the risk of laboratory-acquired infection, restrict manipula-
tion of certain potential agents (e.g., Francisella tularensis,
Brucella species, Coxiella burnetii, Burkholderia mallei, and
Burkholderia pseudomallei) to environments under certiﬁed
class II biological safety cabinet or BSL-3 conditions [7].
The CDC is responsible for monitoring the reference
labs via regular proﬁciency training [30]. It cannot do
the entire job alone and delegates some of the work to
states local municipalities. This introduces some pitfalls and
inconsistencies to the LRN. Many states and locals have
diﬀerent laws regulating this reporting. Additionally, as some
of the sentinel labs are privately owned, only moderate
oversight can occur at this level. To this end, a recent survey6 Advances in Preventive Medicine
Table 2: Laboratory divisions within the laboratory response network.
Level A Laboratory
(Sentinel Labs) Tier 1
Approximately 2300 hospital and clinic labs were likely ﬁrst to
receive specimens. Role is to rule out and refer to a lab within LRN
to conﬁrm a diagnosis.
Level B Laboratory
(Reference Labs) Tier 2
Increased capabilities to conﬁrm diagnoses of biological agent.
County public health labs where role is conﬁrmatory testing,
initial susceptibility testing, and referral.
Level C Laboratory
(Reference Labs) Tier 2
Much like level B, State public health labs that conﬁrm diagnosis
and refer to national laboratory. There are approximately 160
reference labs (B and C).
Level D Laboratory
(National Labs) Tier 3
National laboratories whose primary responsibility is to further
characterize the agent (CDC, USAMRIID have biosafety level IV
(BSL-4) capabilities).
showed that only 73.8% of reporting labs indicated that they
hadsuﬃcientpersonnel,equipment,andtrainingtorespond
to a bioterrorism event [27]. Another study performed
exercises with three category A organisms of bioterrorism
(Anthrax, Plague, and Tularemia). In this study, sentinel
laboratories only correctly identiﬁed 84% of bioterrorism
agents [26]. This study showed that sentinel lab performance
is improving, but still not likely at this optimal goal.
6.EnvironmentalSurveillance
There are two categories of environmental detection systems
currently in existence, the remote or standoﬀ detection
of aerosol clouds and the point detection systems of the
environment [2].
6.1. Remote Detection Systems. O n ew a yt h a tr e m o t ed e t e c -
tion systems monitor for potential biothreats from a distance
isbytheobservationofaerosolizedmassesorclouds.Finding
and evaluating the contents of a cloud is referred to as
“standoﬀ”d e t e c t i o n[ 28]. On its most basic level, these
detectors aim to alert military or civilian public health
personnel to the presence of an approaching cloud. After the
initial identiﬁcation of the cloud, a more detailed assessment
of the contents, such as water droplets, inert inorganic mate-
rial, dead biotic particulates, or nonpathogenic microbes,
is pursued [28]. Remote or standoﬀ detection surveillance
systems include cloud recognition by Doppler radio and
radar, the Army’s long- and short-range biological standoﬀ
detection systems. The Army’s standoﬀ detection systems are
capable of detecting aerosol clouds from long distances, as
well as determining their composition using ultraviolet light
reﬂectance [2].
6.2. Point Detection Systems. Point detection systems are
those that sample an environmental source, attempting to
detect and identify the agent. Speciﬁc identiﬁcation of a
biologic agent by rapid diagnostics at the site of the attack
can be done using immunologic assays, genetic assays,
and mass spectrometry [2]. These systems can further be
diﬀerentiated by the type and location of sample collected.
For example, The Interim Biological Agent Detector is used
on US naval ships to monitor the air for an increase in
particulate concentrations [1]. Biowatch is an example of an
environmental detection system that takes aerosol samples
from locations in ﬁxed sites, such as airports or public
buildings.
6.3. Biowatch. In July of 2003, the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS), the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), and the CDC introduced the Biowatch program—
a federal monitoring system intended to speed detection of
speciﬁcbiologicalagentsthatcouldbereleasedinaerosolized
form during a biological attack. Biowatch air sampling
devices are deployed in 31 major U.S. cities. The air samples
typically are tested daily for signs of the particular biological
agents being monitored [2, 29].
The core purpose and intent of Biowatch is to hasten
the public health response to a covert bioattack. This would
allow rapid distribution of medical countermeasures, like
antibiotics or vaccinations, thereby saving lives [30]. To this
end, there are 500 air ﬁlters in these 31 urban areas that work
as Biowatch sensors. These sensors have also been deployed
to select indoor venues and are used to monitor mass-
gathering events, such as the Super Bowl. This nationwide
surveillance system uses distributed aerosol collectors to
capture airborne ppapers onto removable dry ﬁlters that
are transported daily to LRN laboratories for analysis [30].
An expanded deployment of the same technology in 2005
was referred to as Generation 2 Biowatch. Generation 2
Biowatch reportedly can sample and report detection from
10 to 36 hours [31]. Biowatch sensors are intended to
be integrated into a complex network of environmental
monitoring,medicalsurveillanceactivities,andpublichealth
response. It is thought that this integration of public
awareness information, as well as syndromic, laboratory, and
environmental surveillance technologies and systems, would
be the best defense against a bioterrorist attack [2, 31].
Biowatch is not perfect. As currently operated, Biowatch
ﬁlters are collected every 24 hours and delivered to local
laboratories,wheretheyareanalyzedaccordingtoprescribed
protocols. If this analysis recognizes one of the ﬁve biothreat
agents that the system is designed to detect, it is termed a
BiowatchActionableResult(BAR).LaboratoriesreportBARs
to local public health oﬃcials, who must then decide howAdvances in Preventive Medicine 7
to respond. This decision is not taken lightly. The decision
t ot r e a taB A Ra se v i d e n c eo fab i o a t t a c kc o u l dh a v eh u g e
consequences if it were a false alarm, including destructive
impacts on the community’s conﬁdence in the public health
system. Since 2003, there have been a number of BARs,
though none have been the result of a biological attack.
In some BAR cases, Biowatch samples contained material
that was genetically similar to that found in Biowatch target
organisms. These cases turned out to be from microbes that
are present in the ambient environment but do not represent
a threat to humans. Progress has been made in developing
lab tests that distinguish these close relatives of bioweapons
and work on more speciﬁc lab assays is ongoing [31].
Warnings from Biowatch would only be timelier than
current health care systems under speciﬁc circumstances.
Those are if a large-scale aerosol attack were to use certain
biological agents and occur where Biowatch is deployed and
if Biowatch successfully detects the biological agent [29].
Generation 3 Biowatch is currently in development. The
next evolution of environmental sensor technology has been
referred to as a “lab in a box” [31]. Gen 3 Biowatch would
be more sophisticated than the current Biowatch sensors,
with the ability to automatically collect outdoor air samples,
perform molecular analysis of the samples, and report the
results electronically to provide near-real time reporting.
The target requirements for Generation 3 are reduction of
time to diagnosis to 4 hours, increasing targeted biothreat
agents monitored, reducing unit procurement costs down to
$80,000 per detector unit, and detection sensitivity and false-
positive rates remaining consistent with the current system’s
performance [31].
7. Cost/Beneﬁt
A bioterrorist incident is considered a low probability but
high-cost event. The costs are high, because many agents
go undetected until the onset of symptoms when treatment
is less eﬀective and more expensive [32]. That said, it is
not economically feasible to the government to undertake a
blanket deployment of biosensors [2]. Despite the growing
cost, Congress continues to pass legislation intended to
strengthen the nation’s biological surveillance by increasing
funding of federal and state biological surveillance. A 2007
DHS report documented that since the events of 2001,
almost $32 billion has been allocated to biodefense and
biosurveillance in the USA alone [3].
As of 2005, Biowatch costs per year were approximately
$13,672,096. This ﬁgure includes labor costs, site upgrades,
supplies, travel, training, and other operation and mainte-
nance costs [32]. Most agree that this cost is justiﬁed if the
probability of a bioterrorism incident remains high as the
beneﬁts of Biowatch improve.
As the Biowatch network is presently planned to expand
with greater capability, this will increase the costs of the
Biowatch Generation 3 system as compared to the currently
deployedGenerations1and2systems.Consideringtheoper-
ational complexity of current US biosurveillance systems, it
is imperative that the operational advantages and feasibility
of the proposed system be carefully evaluated and that actual
performance of Generation 3 be tested in ﬁeld conditions
before large technology acquisition investments are made.
TheDepartmentofHomelandSecuritywillcontinuetowork
collaboratively to conduct and oversee developmental and
operational tests of Biowatch 3 [31].
8. Limitations/CurrentChallenges
Despite the massive increase in funding and resources that
has catapulted our capability for increased biosurveillance
over the past decade, both in the US and abroad, there
remain several challenges that must be addressed. The value
of disease surveillance systems to public health oﬃcials is
greatest when several systems are used together. The primary
limitation of disease surveillance at this point is the limited
coordination and lack of interoperability among the various
private and federal surveillance systems.
As part of the 9/11 Commission Act, the National Bio-
surveillance Integration Center (NBIC) was created within
the Department of Homeland Security to integrate informa-
tion and support an interagency biosurveillance community.
A 2009 report from the US Government Accountability
Oﬃce on the state of biosurveillance and resource use
concluded that there exists confusion, uncertainty, and
skepticism around the value of the interagency community,
as well as the mission and purpose of the NBIC within
that community. Furthermore, there was a lack of clarity
about roles, responsibilities, joint strategies, policies, and
procedures for operating across agency borders [33].
Each individual system provides useful information,
though no single system is complete [5]. Since it is possible
to travel to most places in the world in less time than the
incubationperiodformanyinfectiousdiseases,ournetworks
must be expanded to allow for global surveillance [9].
The World Health Organization produced a major overhaul
of their International Health Regulations in 2005 with a
speciﬁc focus on the coordination of the global public health
response to natural disasters, accidental release, or deliberate
use of biological and chemical agents that can aﬀect global
public health [3]. But this cooperation must exist at every
level—local, state, federal, and international—to maximize
the eﬀects of surveillance.
Anotherchallengeofourcurrentsurveillanceapproachis
the consequences of false-positive activation. These systems
must be designed for high sensitivity given the overlap of
commonplace pathogens with potential bioterror agents.
Unfortunately, this may often sacriﬁce the speciﬁcity of the
systems. The false alarms may be due to technical malfunc-
tionsortonaturallyoccurringevents,suchasthedetectionof
anthrax in areas with large concentrations of cattle [32]. The
subsequent mobilization of signiﬁcant resources is not only
costlybutcanbeverydistractingandgenerateoverwhelming
public distress.
The acquisition of data to fuel a surveillance system,
especially the syndromic and clinical-based ones, may be
challenged by concerns for privacy of protected health
information (PHI). Though the Health Insurance Portability8 Advances in Preventive Medicine
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule allows for
essential exchanges of health data during a public health
emergency, the ﬂow of PHI may be slowed by misunder-
standings of the Privacy Rule’s accounting requirement. This




Halting the spread of a bioterrorism attack will take a
combination of the surveillance systems described above. It
is only through active study, proper funding, and creative
invention that we will be able to improve these systems.
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